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A New Antidote for an Opponent's Pretrial
Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct
at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the
Weakness of the Opponent's Case
Edward J. Imwinkelried*
The pliiintiffs counsel continues her closing argument:
"Ladies and gentlemen, for the past half hour we've listened to
opposing counsel's attempt t o defend his client's actions in this
case. I'd like to talk for a few moments about the defense
counsel's own actions in this case. Think back to evidence
which we presented about opposing counsel's destruction of
those accounts payable records. Ask yourself: WHY did he
stoop to doing that? WHY would. he do something so
underhanded? Common sense tells you the answer. Counsel
permitted those invoices to be shredded because he knew that
those records would have shown that his client, the defendant,
recognized a debt to my client, Ms. Grant. The likelihood is
that those records would have shown in black and white that
there was a contract. Counsel destroyed those records for one
reason and one reason alone-because they would have proved
that the defendant had a contract with Ms. Grant. Those
records would have shown that the defendant owes her the
money she's suing today to collect."
From the perspective of an individual litigant, a closing
argument of this tenor could be potent trial'advocacy.' In the
minds of many jurors, a trial is the modern equivalent of a
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; former chair, Evidence
Section, American Association of Law Schools; B.A. 1967, J.D. 1969, University of
San Francisco.
1. In the famous English trial of Robert Wood, the prosecutor "stressed the
fad that Wood had attempted to suborn a number of possible witnesses, and in
many ways had tried to tamper with potential evidence, and stop evidence
reaching the police through normal channels." The "Crown relied on this attempt
to suborn witnesses and concoct a false alibi as a clear indication of guilt on
170, 194-95
Wood's part." Basil Hogarth, Robert Wood 1907, in FAMOUS TRIALS
(Harry Hodge & James H. Hodge eds., 1986).
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morality play, and the advocate must convince the jury that
"fundamental justice" is on her client's side.2 Jurors view the
trial as a "moral arena,"3 and they endeavor to decide whether
the plaintiff or defendant is on the side of the angels. It is true
that the above hypothetical argument focuses on the opposing
attorney's misdeed rather than on his client's personal
misconduct. However, the attorney is the client's representative
in the litigation; and jurors often assess the client, in part, by
the conduct of the attorney representing her.'
Permitting this type of argument may also be desirable
from the perspective of the litigation system. The very
possibility of this type of argument could deter counsel from
engaging in pretrial discovery misconduct. The general
consensus is that misconduct is widespread during dis~overy.~
Many commentators are of the opinion that deliberate
In a survey of litigators
obstructionism is ~ommonplace.~
conducted by the American Bar Foundation, most respondents
indicated that it is a common occurrence for attorneys drafting
interrogatory answers to wrongfully withhold relevant,
unprivileged information.' Similar misconduct is a regular
occurrence during document produ~tion.~
Another consensus is now emerging: the defensive strategies designed t o curb discovery misconduct have largely failed.
As Judge Myron Bright, senior judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, has observed, it does
little good t o merely order a litigant to do what he should have

2. James W. McElhaney, Goals in Opening Statement, LITIGATION,Winter
1990, at 47, 48; see also James W. McElhaney, The Sense of Injustice, LITIGATION,
Spring 1988, a t 47.
3. James W. McElhaney, Qualities of Winners, LITIGATION,Fall 1992, a t 51,
52.
4. Michael E. Tigar, Jury Argument: You, the Facts, and the Law,
LITIGATION,
Summer 1988, at 19, 20.
& THEODOREBLUMOFF,PRETRIAL DISCOVERY:
5. EDWARDIMWINRELRIED
STRATEGY AND TACTICS8 1 : O l (1986).
6. Robert Howard & Kathleen M. Crowley, Pleading, Discovery, and Pretrial
Procedure for Litigation Against Government Spying, 55 U. DET. J. URB.L. 931,
978 (1978); William H. ReMine 111 & James L. Gilbert, Discovery: Abuses,
Sanctions, and Ethical Concerns, TRIAL,
Jan. 1987, a t 56; Jerold S. Solovy &
Robert L. Byman, Hardball Discovery, LITIGATION,Fall 1988, at 10; Richard L.
Whitworth & James L. Gilbert, Punishing Evidence Destruction: Keeping Discovery
Fair and Open, TRIAL,Nov. 1992, at 66 (calling discovery abuse "widespread").
7. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effmtiveness, Its
Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.RES. J. 789, 829.
8. I ~ K E L R I E D& BLUMOFF,
supra note 5, 5 8:27.

7933

A NEW ANTIDOTE FOR MISCONDUCT

795

done four months b e f ~ r e . ~It is true that many bar
organizations have issued new rules of legal ethics,1° but the
issuance of those rules has not stemmed the tide of discovery
misconduct. In many, if not most, jurisdictions, the bar
disciplinary system is slow and ineffective."
Partly in response to the perceived failure of the bar
disciplinary system, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 16,
and 26 were amended in 1983. The thrust of the amendments
was to toughen the enforcement of discovery obligations.12 In
particular, the amendments were intended to encourage judges
to punish discovery misconduct by imposing sanctions more
aggres~ively.'~
It was hoped that the sanctions "movement"
would discourage obstructionism.14 Although the movement
was promising, it now appears doubtful that sanctions alone
will provide an adequate solution to the problem of discovery
misc~nduct.'~To obtain sanctions, the victim of discovery
abuse must resort to court which may result in distracting
satellite litigation.16 Litigating a sanctions motion can be time
consuming, and becoming embroiled in sanctions litigation is
particularly dangerous in jurisdictions with "fast track"
calendars. Fast track calendars were implemented in many
jurisdictions to reduce delays in litigation." In these
9. Judge Bright made the remark a t the National Practice Institute Seminar
in San Diego, California on January 22, 1993. The author participated in the same
seminar.
10. I n August 1983, the American Bar Association House of Delegates
approved the new Rules of Professional Conduct, replacing the old Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.
11. David 0. Weber, "Still in Good Standing:" The Crisis in Attorney
' L.J., Apr.
Discipline, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1987, a t 58; Lawyer Complaints Rise, NATL
26, 1993, a t 6 ("Complaints against attorneys in Ohio can take years to review,
and very few of those complaints result in disciplinary adion . . . ."); Monitor
Takes Another Slap at Bar Discipline, CAL. LAW., Dec. 1987, at 14. But cf. Timothy
K. McPike & Mark I. Harrison, The True Story on Lawyer Discipline, A.B.A. J.,
Sept. 1984, at 92, 93 (claiming improvement of the bar disciplinary system).
12. See Joan M. Hall, New Amendments Are F a r Reaching, 69 A.B.A. J. 1640
(1983).
STUDYOF RULE 11 SANCTIONS(1985).
13. SAULM. KASSIN,AN EMPIRICAL
14. GREGORY
P. JOSEPH,
SANCTIONS:
THE FEDERALLAW OF L~TIGATION
ABUSE
5 2 (1989).
15. Id. 5 3A(A) (Supp. 1992).
16. IMWINKEWED & BLUMOFF,supra note 5, 9 13:14 (Supp. 1992); Sanctions:
Rule 11 and Other Powers, 1986 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 11-12.
17. Rodney H. Glover, Crisis in the Courts? The Rockt Docket, ~ ~ m , ' A p r .
1993, a t 45; Williams K. Wells, Jr., Expedited Cases: Effiiency Is Crucial to
Success, NAT'LL.J., Mar. 1, 1993, a t 31. See generally CAL.GOVT CODE$$ 6860068620 (the Trial Delay Reduction Act).
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jurisdictions, a litigant may have only a fraction of the time
that she previously had between fling a complaint and trial-a
period of months rather than years. Under a fast track
procedure, a litigant can ill afford to invest weeks or months of
precious pretrial time in pressing a sanctions motion.
There is a growing sense among ethical litigators that they
need to go on the offensive against discovery misconduct. More
specifically, they believe that they need self-help techniques
which they can use as offensive weapons against obstructionist
opponents. Treating the opponent's pretrial obstructionism as
an "admission by conduct"-illustrated by the hypothetical
closing argument quoted earlier-is one potential technique.
While the litigator contemplating such an argument might be
required to seek judicial approval of the argument,18 this
could be done both quickly and informally at the conference
typically held between the close of the evidence and the
delivery of jury instruction^.'^ This procedure for obtaining
judicial approval would be much more streamlined than that of
filing and litigating a sanctions motion. Moreover, t o use Judge
Bright's expression, the technique of "admission by conduct"
does far more than merely order the opponent t o do what he or
she should have done four months before; it could make the
opponent pay a real price for discovery misconduct if the
misconduct incenses the jury and the jury expresses its anger
in the verdict.20
In criminal cases, the courts frequently admit testimony
about an accused's pretrial misconduct on the theory that the
misconduct evidences the accused's consciousness of guilt. For
instance, if the accused threatens the prosecution's witnesses or
conceals incriminating physical evidence, the prosecution may
The
use this to help prove the accused's ~ulpability.~~
18. Many jurisdictions require the attorney to obtain the judge's approval
before making a "missing witness" argument during summation. United States v.
Pitts, 918 F.2d 197, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
J. IMWINKELRIED,
DYNAMICS
OF TRIAL
19. RONALDL. CARLSON& EDWARD
PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS8 13.1 (1989).
20. A civil jury's perception of the litigant may affect the damages award.
According to one study, if a civil jury learns that the defendant has a criminal
record, the plaintiff can expect to recov'er a verdict % higher than normal. If the
civil jury learns that the plaintiff has a record, the plaintiff is likely to recover a
&
verdict 16% below the national average for similar cases. DAVIDL. HERBERT
ROGERK. B A R R ~ATTORNEY'
,
S MASTER GUIDETO COURTROOM
PSYCHOLOGY:
HOW
TO APPLY BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCETECHNIQUES
FOR NEW TRIALSUCCESS320-21
(1980).
21. EDWARDJ. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED
MISCONDUCT
EVIDENCE8 3:04
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accused's behavior sometimes takes the form of discovery
misconduct such as refusing to submit to a scientific testing
procedure.zz So long as the conduct is the sort of behavior a
guilty person might resort to in order to prevent a conviction,
there is a permissive inference of consciousness of &t. The
prosecution may both introduce testimony about the behavior
and treat the behavior as an admission by conductZ3during
closing argument. By doing so, the prosecutor invites the jury
to infer the accused's guilt from the accused's conduct. In effect,
The
by acting in this manner, the accused "admits" his
criminal courts have even extended this doctrine to situations
in which the pretrial misconduct was that of the defense
counsel rather than the accused.25

'

(1984). California Evidence Code section 413 explicitly states, "In determining what
inferences to draw from the evidence or fads in the case against a party, the trier
of fact may consider, among other things, the party's . . . willful suppression of
evidence relating thereto . . . . "). See Bihun v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr.
2d 787 (Ct. App. 1993); People v. Fitzpatrick, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (Ct. App. 1992);
cf. P.R. R. EVID. 16.5 (similar to CAL. EVID.CODE$ 413).
22. United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1989) (refusal to provide
handwriting sample); Spicer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 562 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (refusal
to submit to a breathalyzer test); People v. McPeters, 832 P.2d 146 (Cal. 1992)
(refusal to cooperate during a psychiatric examination), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1865 (1993); People v. Roberts, 826 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1992) (refusal to take blood
test), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 436 (1992); Commonwealth v. Monahan, 549 A.2d 231
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (refusal to submit to a neutron activation analysis test),
appeal denied, 559 A.2d 36 (1989).
ON EVIDENCE
$8 263-65 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)
23. MCCORMICK
[hereinafter MCCORMICK].
In truth, testimony about this type of conduct does not
fall within the technical definition of hearsay. Under Federal Rule 801(a), evidence
amounts to hearsay only if it constitutes an assertive statement or act. The
declarant must intend the statement or act to communicate factual information.
Thus, it would be hearsay for a declarant to say, "My position in this litigation is
weak," or to nod approval when asked, "Is your position in this litigation weak?"
The declarant does not subjectively intend to communicate information when she
attempts to bribe a witness or suppress a relevant document.
However, there is early common law authority treating nonverbal conduct
implying a statement as a hearsay statement. Id. 8 250. The terminology
"admission by conduct" originated under common law. In light of that authority,
the condud could be considered hearsay; to justifj. introducing evidence of the
conduct, it was necessary to hring the evidence within a recognized hearsay
exception or exemption such as the doctrine permitting the admission of testimony
about a party-opponent's admissions. The contraction of the definition of hearsay
eliminates the need to invoke an exception or exemption, but the terminology
persists.
24. Id.
25. John H. Mansfield, Evidential Use of Litigation Activity of the Parties, 43
SYRACUSE L. REV. 695, 727 n.90 (1992) (citing United States v. Harris, 914 F.2d
927 (7th Cir. 1990), a case in which the defense counsel suggested to a witness
that the witness had seen a third party, not the accused, at the crime scene).

,
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In contrast, in civil cases, the courts have been more
reluctant t o invoke the admission by conduct doctrine against
litigants. On the one hand, they have applied the doctrine
when the litigant herself has committed criminal or tortious
acts obstructing pretrial discovery. Thus, the courts will admit
evidence of a litigant's personal spoliation of eviden~e'~
such
as a civil defendant's destruction of relevant documents or
physical evidence. However, the courts generally have balked
at admitting evidence of lawful conduct by the litigant and her
attorney. At a series of continuing legal education seminars
sponsored by the National Practice Institute in 1992-93,''
some attorneys and judges in attendance remarked that it
would be "unheard of" t o admit an attorney's pretrial discovery
misconduct against the attorney's client at trial on this theory.
In late 1992, Professor John Mansfield of the Harvard Law
School published a provocative article entitled Evidential Use of
Litigation Activity of the Parties." As a general rule, a
statement in an affidavit by a client, submitted in support of a
pretrial motion, may come back to haunt the client as a
personal admission at the subsequent trial?' Similarly, as
Professor Mansfield notes, a remark by the client's attorney
during the opening statement in one trial might be offered as a
vicarious admission against the same client in a later trial.30
Mansfield observes that the pretrial and trial activity of both
litigants and their attorneys can generate evidence against the
litigants. He takes the position that such evidence should be
admissible against the client unless there is a substantial
likelihood that evidential use of the activity will deter an

26. 2 SPENCERA. GARD,JONES
ON EVIDENCE
§ 13:46, at 517 11.61 (6th ed.
1972); Brian E. Howard, Spoliation of Evidence, 49 J. MO. B. 121 (1993); see also
Sullivan v. General Motors Corp., 772 F. Supp. 358, 360 (N.D. Ohio 1991); John
M. Maguire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied horn Spoliation or Related
Conduct, 45 YALEL.J. 226 (1935). In Meyer v. M c D o ~ e l l ,392 A.2d 1129 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1978), the court held that a medical malpractice defendant's attempt
to "tamper" with the plaintif'f's expert witnesses was admissible as evidence of the
defendant physician's consciousness of the weakness of his case.
27. The seminars were conducted in San Diego, California (January 22, 1993),
Los Angeles, California (January 23, 1993), and Minneapolis, Minnesota (March 21,
1993). The author participated in each of these seminars where he raised the
possibility of treating the opposition's pretrial discovery misconduct as an admission
a t trial.
28. Mansfield, supra note 25, a t 695.
29. FED.R. EVID. 801(d)(2XA); see also United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26,
30-33 (2d Cir. 1984).
30. Mansfield, supra note 25, a t 716-22.

7931

A NEW ANTIDOTE FOR MISCONDUCT

799

activity which furthers an important objective of the litigation
process?' He argues, however, that there is such a significant
interest in "uninhibited [pretrial discovery] investigative
evidence of that activity
activity" that as a
should be inad~nissible.~~
This article explores the extent to which Professor
Mansfield's generalization should apply t o the discovery
misconduct of litigants and their attorneys. The thesis of this
article is that discovery misconduct should be excepted from
the generalization. The first section of this article addresses the
question of whether a civil litigant's personal discovery
misconduct should be admissible against the litigant client at
trial as an "admission by conduct" of the weakness of the
client's position. The section concludes that the evidence should
be admissible even when the conduct is neither criminal nor
tortious. The conduct should be treated as an admission by
conduct so long as the conduct supports a rational, permissive
inference that the client believes his or her position in the
litigation to be weak. The second section of this article turns t o
the related question of whether the discovery misconduct of the
litigant's attorney should be admissible against the litigant
even when the litigant has neither authorized nor ratified the
conduct. This section argues that the attornefs conduct is
relevant and ought to be admissible for this purpose. However,
the section also concedes that as a practical matter, the courts
in some jurisdictions will probably exclude testimony about
such conduct whenever its admission would run afoul of the
advocate-witness prohibition-the rule of legal ethics generally
prohibiting attorneys from testifying at trials at which they
serve as advocates. In most jurisdictions, the routine
recognition of a litigant's right to prove the opposing attorney's
pretrial discovery misconduct will likely have t o await the
reform of the advocate-witness rule.

31. Id. at 701-02.
32. Id. at 727.
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A. The Probative Value of Evidence of the
Client's Personal Misconduct
Suppose that before trial, the opposing client personally
commits an act of spoliation of evidence.33Although he realizes that a particular document is relevant to a pending lawsuit,
he is also aware that its contents would undermine his position
in the lawsuit. He consequently destroys the document. By
doing so, in many jurisdictions, he commits an independent
tort." In some jurisdictions with broadly worded obstruction
of justice statutes, he also may have perpetrated a crime.35Although evidence of such misconduct will be embarrassing to the
client, at the subsequent trial in the same lawsuit many courts
would admit the evidence on the theory that his acts amounted
to an admission by conduct." The fact that the client resorted
to this tactic is probative circumstantial evidence that he believes that his position in the litigation is weak. To be sure,
there are other possible explanations for the client's conduct.
For instance, the client may have resorted to this tactic simply
as "additional insurance" of victory. However, there is at least a
permissive inference that the client's motivation was a belief
that he would lose on the merits if the opposition discovered
the document in question. In turn, the client's consciousness of
the weakness of his position is some evidence that the position
is indeed weak. Admittedly, it is possible that the client is
mistaken about the invalidity of his position in the litigation;
the client might be laboring under a misapprehension about
the governing substantive law. However, compared to the judge
and jurors, the client is in a particularly good position t o know
the merit of his position. His belief that his position lacks merit
is probative of the.position's weakness.
33. See, e.g., Foster v. Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831 (D. Kan.
1992); Destruction or Loss of Evidence: Marroca, v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d
220 (CA7 1992), 36 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE511 (1992).
34. Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, Interfering with Prospective Civil Action, as Actionable, 70 A.L.R.4th 984 (1989).
35. Jane M. Graf'feo, Note, Ethics, Law, and Loyalty: The Attorney's Duty to
Tun Over Incriminating Physical Evidence, 32 STAN. L. REV.977, 987-92 (1980).
36. Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1993); GARD, supra
supm note 23, §§ 264-65; Maguire & Vinnote 26, 8 13:46, at 517; MCCORMICK,
cent, supra note 26.
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The question that arises, though, is whether this theory of
admissibility applies only when the act committed by the client
constitutes an independent tort or crime. Suppose, for example,
that although the act violated the client's discovery obligations,
the act amounted to neither a criminal offense nor a tort. Could
evidence of the act nevertheless be admitted on a consciousness
of liability theory? As previously stated, in the past the courts
have been reluctant t o extend the doctrine this far.37 One
leading treatise indicates that the theory is limited to fact
situations in which the client "resort[s] t o wrongful devices."38
That limitation is unsound. In the cases in which courts
have admitted testimony about criminal or tortious acts evidencing consciousness of liability or guilt, they have not done
so because the acts constituted crimes or torts.3gRather, they
have admitted the evidence despite the fact that the act coincidentally amounted to a crime or tort!'
The jury's realization
that the client committed a crime or tort might well prejudice
the jurors against the client. The risk of such prejudice is a
potential reason for excluding otherwise admissible evidence." Under the legal relevance doctrine, codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 403 governing in federal practice (35 states
have adopted evidence codes patterned after the Federal
~ules)," a judge may exclude otherwise admissible, relevant
evidence when she fears that the introduction of the evidence
would generate "unfair prejudice" against the litigant."3 Even
if the jurors were not convinced of the client's liability, they
might be tempted to return a verdict adverse to the client as a
means of punishing the client for his misdeed.
In spite of Rule 403, the courts routinely admit consciousness-of-liability or &t evidence for the simple reason that it is
37. GARD,supra note 26, (5 13:46, discusses the theory, but almost all the
cases cited involve a d s which are tortious or criminal.
38. MCCORMICK,
supra note 23, Q 265, at 465.
39. IMWINKELRIED,supm note 21, Q 2:16, at 43; 1 FRANCISWHARTON,CRIMINAL EVIDENCEQ 233 (12th ed. 1955).
40. United States v. Beechum, 555 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 582
H. WIGMORE,
F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979); 2 JOHN
AT COMMON
LAW (5 305 (rev. ed. 1979).
EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS
41. 2 DAVIDW. LOUISELL& CHRISTOPHER
B. MUELLER,FEDERALEVIDENCE
5 140 (rev. ed. 1985).
42. RONALDL. CARLSONET AL., EVIDENCEIN THE NINETIES26-27 (3d ed.
1991) (listing 34 states). In addition, Kentucky recently adopted a code modeled
after the Federal Rules. Similar evidence codes will soon go into effect in a number of other jurisdictions, including Indiana.
43. FED. R. EVID.403.
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highly relevant to show the client's belief that her case is weak.
It is not the act's character as a crime or tort which supplies its
logical relevance.44Even if the act were perfectly lawful, the
facts would remain: after realizing that the document was
relevant in a pending lawsuit, the client suppressed the document. Standing alone, those facts support a rational inference
that the document's contents would have damaged the client's
position in the litigation.
It is true that in many jurisdictions, spoliation of evidence
now constitutes a tort.45However, the recognition of spoliation
as an independent tort is a recent, twentieth century phenomen ~ n . 'The
~ cases admitting evidence of spoliation as proof of
consciousness of liability antedate the treatment of spoliation
as a tort. As early as the seventeenth century, English courts
permitted the opponent to invite the jury to draw an adverse
inference from a client's spoliation of relevant eviden~e.~'
The
application of the consciousness-of-liability theory t o spoliation
evidence has an ancient lineage, even though spoliation is a
relative newcomer in tort law. In short, literally for centuries
the courts permitted juries to draw an inference of consciousness of liability from acts of spoliation although the spoliation
did not amount to a tort.
The law of privileges also points to the conclusion that the
client's discovery misconduct should be admissible even when
the misconduct falls short of a crime or tort. In many jurisdictions, when a litigant claims a common-law or statutory privilege a t trial, during closing argument the opposition may urge
the jury to infer that the suppressed testimony would have
been unfavorable to the litigant invoking the privilege.48 In
these cases, the litigant's conduct is entirely lawful. As holder
of the privilege, the litigant has a right to bar the testimony.
That right is the essence of the privilege. Yet these jurisdic-

44. IMWINKELRIED,
supm note 21, § 2:16; 1 WHARTON,
supra note 39, § 233.
45. See, e.g., Foster v. Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831 (D.Kan.
1992).
S. GORELICKET AL., DESTRUCTION
OF EVIDENCE
46. See generally JAMIE
(1989) (analyzing the history and development of the law concerning destruction of
& WILLIAMH. FORTUNE,
TRIALETHICS
H. UNDERWOOD
evidence). See also RICHARD
§ 5.11.2, at 216 (1988) (calling spoliation of evidence "a new tort"); Note, Should
Iowa Adopt the Tort of Intentional Spoliation of Evidence in Civil Litigation?, 41
DRAKEL. REV. 179 (1982).
47. Howard, supra note 26, at 130 n.20; see also Sam LaManna, Courts Take
a Harder Line on Spoliation, NAT'L L.J., July 26, 1993, at 17.
48. MCCORMICK,supra note 23, 8 74.1.
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tions allow the opposition to present the argument in summation because there is nevertheless a permissive inference that
the excluded testimony would have shown the weakness of the
litigant's position. "No showing of wrong or fraud seems to be
required. . . for the inference that the evidence if produced
In context, the assertion of
would have been unfav~rable."~~
the privilege gives rise to that rational inference, and that
inference validates the closing argument. Analogously, whenever a client's a d of discovery misconduct gives rise t o the requisite inference, the act is relevant as evidence of the client's
consciousness of the weakness of his position in the litigation.

B. Counterarguments to the Admissibility of the
Client's Discovery Misconduct
The logical relevance of an item of evidence does not guarantee its admission at trial. In numerous cases, the courts
exclude relevant evidence. In some cases, they do so under
statutes such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403 on the ground
that incidental probative dangers substantially outweigh the
probative value of the evidence, as mentioned earlier. In other
cases, they do so to promote an extrinsic social policy. The
attorney-client privilege is a case in point. Upholding that privilege can result in the exclusion of relevant, demonstrably reliable evidence. However, the courts sustain these privilege
claims on the ground that the existence of the privilege promotes candor between client and attorney and thereby contributes to the effective functioning of the legal system.50Both
grounds for exclusion can be invoked t o attack the admissibility
of evidence of the client's discovery misconduct, offered on a
consciousness-of-liability theory.
1. The probative value of such evidence is outweighed by the
probative danger that the introduction of the evidence and rebuttal testimony will focus the jury's attention on a collateral
issue and distract the jury from the historical merits of the case
The principal task facing the trier of fact is to decide the
historical merits of the case. To do so, the trier must usually
resolve questions about a central historical event such as a

49. Id. 8 74.1, at 104.
50. See Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J . LEGALSTUD.359 (1990).
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traffic accident or commercial transaction. To the extent that
the trial judge admits evidence about other "collateral" occurrences-events other than the main events on the merits of the
case-there is a risk that the jurors will lose sight of the main
events on which they should focus. For example, under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, the judge may exclude relevant evidence
when she concludes that the evidence poses a substantial danger of "confusion of the issues . . . or misleading the
A party resisting the admission of evidence of his discovery
misconduct might cite Rule 403 as support for the argument
that the evidence will distract the jury from the merits of the
case. The argument is plausible. For example, the question is
not whether the defendant physically blocked access t o a plant
which the plaintiff's expert was scheduled t o inspect; the question is whether the plant is an unreasonably dangerous work
site. Likewise, the question is not whether the defendant concealed an accounts payable log page reflecting a debt to the
plaintiff; the question is whether the defendant received a
shipment of merchandise from the plaintiff.
However, it would be a mistake t o think that as a matter
of course, trial judges exercise their discretion under Rule 403
to exclude any item of evidence relating to an event other than
the central historical event on the merits of the case. Quite the
contrary is true. For example, in tort product liability actions,
plaintiffs frequently introduce evidence of other accidents inEvidence
volving the same or a similarly designed produ~t.~'
of other accidents involving other victims is admissible t o establish the existence of the defect in the product's design.53
"Indeed, from a jury's point of view, there may be no more
important evidence on the issue of the product's defective condition than the performance and experience of that product in
the real
It would certainly be inaccurate to claim
that judges never exercise discretion t o exclude evidence of
collateral ac~idents;~but the courts seem receptive t o testi51. FED. R. EVID.403.
52. Mary A. Parker & Susan Garner, Special Evidentiary Issues in Products
Cases, TRIAL, Nov. 1991, at 41, 42 ("[Ulnder the case law and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, evidence of similar accidents is normally admitted."); see also Francis H.
Hare, Jr. & Mitchell K. Shelly, The,Admissibility of Other Similar Incident Euidence: A Three-Step Approach, 15 AM. J. TRIALADVOC.541 (1992).
53. IMWINREWED, supm note 21, 8 7:21.
54. Gary C. Robb, Admissibility of Prior Accidents Can Be a Rky Euidentiary
Issue, NAT'LL.J.,July 10, 1989, at 18.
55. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Euidence: Getting It Out
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mony about collateral events so long as the events have significant probative worth on the historical merits of the case.56
Like evidence of another accident proffered in a product
liability case, testimony about discovery misconduct can be
highly relevant circumstantial proof. When an identically designed product malfunctions and the defendant manufacturer
cannot offer a credible, alternative explanation for the cause of
the accident, there is a powerful inference that the product has
a design defect. Similarly, when a client singles out and destroys only the records relating to the commercial transaction
on which the plaintiff is suing, there is a strong inference that
the records would have demonstrated the defendant's liability.
On its face, Rule 403 permits the judge to balance the probative value of the item of evidence against the attendant probative dangers. Although in both cases (the other accident and
the discovery misdeed) the evidence relates to "collateral"
events, it is equally true that both items of evidence can have
considerable probative worth. When they possess substantial
probative value, both types of evidence can survive scrutiny
under Rule 403.
Even in an extreme case when the evidence of the client's
discovery misconduct has only marginal probative value, the
trial judge can usually reduce the danger of jury distraction to
acceptable proportions without altogether excluding the evidence. The trial judge's ruling need not be an "all or nothing"
prop~sition.~'Under Rule 403, it is quite common for the
judge t o admit some of the proffered evidence but exclude the
balance.58 If the client were guilty of several incidents of discovery misconduct, the judge could reduce the risk of distraction by limiting the number of incidents provable at trial.59Or
suppose that the plaintiff proposes calling four witnesses to
testify to the defendant's act of discovery misconduct. The judge
into the Light, TRLAL,
Nov. 1984, at 58.
56. Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, SA., 979 F.2d 1434, 1440
(10th Cir. 1992) ("In such actions, courts routinely permit the introduction of substantially similar ads . . ."); Jackson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d
1070, 1082-83 (5th Cir.. 1986); James B. Sales, Admissibility of Evidence of Other
Similar Accidents or Complaints and Evulence of Subsequent Remedial Measures,
1984 S.M.U.PRODUCTS
L I A B I INSTITUTE
~
9 6.01[3] ('!The requisite degree of
similarity is plainly not very high.") (quoting Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d
1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1978)).
supm note 21, 9 8:32, at 61.
57. IMWINKEWED,
58. Id.
59. Id.

.
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could minimize the risk of distraction by restricting the plainIn short, even though pretrial acts of
tiff to two witne~ses.~'
discovery misconduct are technically collateral to the main
events in issue, the probative danger of distraction does not
justify a general rule excluding the client's pretrial discovery
misconduct.
2. The evidence should be excluded on the policy ground that
the admission of such evidence will pressure the client's attorney to testify in violation of the advocate-witness prohibition
As Professor Mansfield notes, the advocate-witness prohibition can conceivably block the evidential use of a party's litigaUnder the American Bar Association's former
tion a~tivity.~'
Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer generally could
not testify in a case in which she was acting as trial attorney:'
the lawyer would be personally disqualified from trying
the case. Moreover, the Code vicariously disqualified any other
member of the lawyer's firm from trying the case.63Under the
ABA's current Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyerwitness is still personally disqualified; but the vicarious disqualification of other firm members is no longer in effect.64It
is true that, on their face, these provisions are rules of legal
ethics; however, many courts have enforced the rules by excluding proposed testimony by lawyers that would run afoul of the
ethical proscription^.^^
Notwithstanding these proscriptions, the courts ordinarily
should admit evidence about a client's personal discovery misconduct. Even assuming arguendo that the courts ought to
exclude testimony violative of the advocate-witness prohibition,
in many, if not most, cases in which a party offers such evidence, neither the proponent party nor the opponent will have
to resort to testimony that would violate these proscriptions.
In the typical case, the proponent will not have to present
her own attorney's testimony to establish the opposing client's
discovery misconduct. Suppose, for example, that the miscon60. See United States v. Benefield, 889 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1989) (restriding
the number of charader witnesses); CARLSONW AL., supra note 42, at 320.
61. Mansfield, supra note 25, at 704-06.
62. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITYDR 5-101(B) (1969).
63. Id.
64. MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCTRule 3.7 (1983).
CRIMINALEVIDENCE5 214
65. EDWARDJ. IMWINKELRIEDW AL., COURTROOM
(1987).
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duct takes the form of a misleading affidavit or declaration
submitted in connection with a pretrial discovery motion. The
proponent will not have to proffer her attorney's testimony t o
authenticate the affidavit or declaration; the document will be
on file with the court, and the judge may judicially notice the
contents of the court files.66Judicial notice dispenses with the
necessity for live testimony. Further, assume that the miscondud occurs at a deposition hearing. The court reporter's official
transcript of the hearing will document the misconduct. The
transcript can be admitted based on the reporter's testimony or
an attached, self-authenticating attesting certificate executed
Or suppose that the opposing client personby the rep~rter.~'
ally interfered with an expert's scheduled examination of either
the client's personal condition or property in the client's custody. Since the expert herself could testify to the client's acts,
there would be no need to call the proponent's attorney. Indeed,
the proponent's attorney might not have even witnessed the
opposing client's acts; attorneys frequently do not attend such
examinations and inspe~tions.~~
Now shift to the perspective of the client who allegedly
committed the pretrial discovery misconduct. As a practical
matter, will that client have to call his attorney to rebut the
testimony about the alleged misconduct? Since the client has
firsthand knowledge of his own conduct, the client can testify
about his action or inaction. Again, in many instances, the
attorney will not even be present when the conduct occurs.
A closer question would arise, though, if the client adrnitted the conduct but contended that his motivation was not any
realization of the weakness of his position in the litigation, but
instead good faith reliance on advice given him by his attorney.
In this situation, would the client need t o call his attorney to
the stand t o establish his contention? Even here the client
could prove his contention without calling his attorney as a
witness. The client could testify to the attorney's advice over
any hearsay objection. Although the client is testifying about a
sentence uttered out-of-court by the attorney, the sentence
would be admissible as nonhearsay. If the advice took the form

66. EDWARD
J. IMWINKELRIED
ET AL., CALIFORNIA
EVIDENTIARY
FOUNDATIONS
468 (1988).
67. EDWARDJ. IMWINKELRIED,EVIDENTIARY
FOUNDATIONS
300-01 (2d ed.
1989).
68. IMWINKELRIED
& BLUMOFF,
supra note 5, # 9:13, 9:26.
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of an order or suggestion by the attorney, the sentence would
be imperative in form. The hearsay rule applies only to assertive statement^,"^ and the rule is consequently limited to
statements which are declarative sentences or used as declarative assertion^.^^ Moreover, even if on its face the statement
was a declarative sentence, the client would be offering the
testimony for a legitimate, nonhearsay purpose. The hearsay
rule applies only when the proponent offers the out-of-court
statement to prove the truth of the assertion contained in the
statement.'l When an out-of-court statement is offered to
prove only the effect on the state of mind of the hearer or reader, the statement is admissible as nonhearsay-the so-called
mental input theory of logical relevance." The mental input
theory is applicable here; the client contends that the
attorney's advice produced in his mind a good faith belief that
his conduct was permissible.
In an extreme case, the proponent of the evidence of the
opposing client's misconduct might dispute the client's testimony that the client's attorney had given him this advice. In this
version of the scenario, the client might have occasion to call
his attorney t o the stand to corroborate his testimony. However, once the admissibility of evidence of the litigant's discovery
misconduct became a well-settled proposition, there is a likelihood that it would become common practice to reduce such
advice to writing. When the advice was in writing, the client
could not only test* to the advice over a hearsay objection, but
also introduce the writing to support his testimony without
having to call his attorney as a corroborative witness. At this
late juncture in the litigation, the client would undoubtedly be
familiar with his attorney's handwriting style. Therefore the
client would be a competent witness to authenticate the
attorney's written advice.73
Hence, even positing that the courts should exclude testimony by advocate-witnesses, the courts can embrace the proposition that evidence of an opposing client's personal pretrial
discovery misconduct is admissible. In many instances in which
such evidence is offered, neither its proponent nor the opposing

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

FED.R. EVID.801(a).
CARLSONET AL., supra note 42, at 569-74.

FED.R. EVID. 801(~).
CARLSONET AL., supra note 42, at 578.
FED. R. EVID. 901(bX2).
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client will need to resort to advocate-witness testimony. As we
have seen, the client's personal misdeeds can be highly probative on the question of the merit of the client's position in the
litigation. Furthermore, neither the legal relevance doctrine nor
the advocate-witness prohibition should bar the courts from
announcing that as a general proposition, a party may offer
evidence of the opposing client's misconduct on a consciousnessof-liability or guilt theory at trial.
MISCONDUCT
BY THE OPPOSING
11. DISCOVERY
CLIENT'S
ATTORNEY
Part I demonstrated that the courts should treat a client's
own pretrial discovery misconduct as an admission by conduct
at trial. This section turns now to the question of whether that
treatment should extend to discovery misconduct by the client's
attorney. Concededly, the probative value of the attorney's
misdeeds is not identical to that of the client's personal misconduct. Further, the considerations countervailing against admissibility differ somewhat when the miscreant is the attorney
rather than the client. Nevertheless, on balance, like the
client's own misdeeds, the attorney's discovery misconduct
should be admissible at trial on the theory that it eviden-ces
the weakness of the client's position in the litigation.

A. The Probative Value of Evidence of is conduct
by the Client's Attorney
Part 1.A discussed the logical relevance of a client's personal discovery misconduct. The initial inferential step is concluding from the conduct that the client subjectively believed that
his position in the litigation was weak and that such belief
presumably motivated the conduct. The final inferential step is
a conclusion as t o the weakness of the position; the court permits the proponent to treat the client's belief as substantive
evidence that the client's position lacks merit.
Superficially, the logical relevance analysis differs when
the actor is the client's attorney. It would arguably be suspect
to infer the client's state of mind from the attorney's conduct.
The Federal Rules of Evidence liberalize the admissibility of
lay opinion testi~nony,'~
but many courts continue t o exclude
74. 2 GREGORY
P.JOSEPH ET AL., EVIDENCE
IN AMERICA:
THE FEDERAL
RULES
STATES
8 50.3 (1987).

IN THE
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one person's opinion as to another person's state of mind.75
These courts consider such opinions too speculative; after all,
one person cannot "read" another person's mind. If we would
not permit the attorney to opine directly as to the client's state
of mind, we should reject a theory of admissibility premised on
an inference of the client's state of mind from the attorney's
behavior.
However, that argument misses the point. The attorney's
misconduct is relevant even if we draw no inference about the
client's state of mind from the conduct. The only inference we
need draw is the attorney's own state of mind, that is, the
attorney's subjective belief that the client's position is weak. In
the fmal analysis, evidence of the attorney's misconduct is not
relevant because of an inference concerning the client's state of
mind; it is relevant only because it leads to the ultimate, material inference that the client's position in the litigation is weak.
Although the logical relevance of the attorney's misconduct
relies on a different intermediate inference, the evidence leads
to the same conclusion, that of the substantive weakness of the
client's position. The theory of logical relevance simply takes a
difTerent route to the same conclusion.
If anything, evidence of the attorney's discovery misconduct
may be more probative of the final inference. In some litigation,
the case is reducible to a factual dispute, and the client has
firsthand knowledge of the pertinent facts. In a simple tort case
arising from a traffic accident, the defendant driver may know
whether he ran the red light. Consequently, his knowledge of
the merits of the case is superior to that of his attorney. However, in many cases, the attorney's sense of the case's merit
may be sounder than that of the client. The case may turn on
the legal significance of the underlying facts, and the attorney
is likely to have a better grasp of the applicable substantive
law. The attorney may even have a better understanding of the
facts than the client. The alleged tortfeasor may have been an
employee of the defendant client. The client himself may have
no personal knowledge of the incident; and certainly by the
time she has concluded significant discovery in the case, the
attorney can have a superior appreciation of the factual merit
of the client's position. In all these cases, the attorney's subjective sense of the case's merit is a better gauge of the objective
75. United States v. Guzzino, 810 F.2d 687, 699 n.15 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
481 U.S.1030 (1987).
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merit of the client's position than is the client's own assessment of the case. Therefore, misconduct by the attorney may be
a n even better gauge of the substantive merits of the client's
case than would be misconduct by the client.

B. Counterarguments to the Admissibility of the Discovery
Misconduct of the Client's Attorney
Like evidence of a client's misdeeds, testimony about the
attorney's discovery misconduct may be excluded although it is
logically relevant. There are a number of possible objections to
the testimony. .
1. The probative value of such evidence is outweighed by the
attendant probative dangers
At first blush, it might appear that evidence of the
attorney's misconduct should a t the very least be more subject
to a Rule 403 objection than should testimony about the client's
misconduct. However, the appearance is deceiving. If the theory
of logical relevance treated the attorney's behavior as a basis
for inferring the client's state of mind, the appearance would be
accurate. On this assumption, testimony about the attorney's
misconduct would usually be less probative; it would be safer to
draw a n inference of the client's state of mind from the client's
own behavior. Since testimony about the attorney's misconduct
would have less probative value, the testimony would be more
vulnerable to a 403 objection.
However, as Part I1.A elaborated, the probative value of
evidence of the attorney's misconduct does not depend on any
inference as to the client's state of mind. Rather, the inference
is from the attorney's behavior to the attorney's own subjective
assessment of the strength of the client's position. That inference is just as direct and trustworthy as the inference from the
client's personal misconduct to the client's subjective state of
mind. When, as is often the case, the attorney is in a better
position to evaluate the merit of the client's position, the
attorney's behavior is more probative of the ultimate fact i n
issue. A trial judge applying Rule 403 to evidence of the
attorney's misdeeds should not assume that the attorney's
behavior is less probative than the client's or that the
attorney's behavior can be more readily excluded under Rule
403. In each case, the judge should consider the quantum of
probative value of the evidence on the issue of the weakness of
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the client's litigation position. In many instances, the probative
worth of the attorney's misconduct will be greater than that of
the client's misconduct. In a given case, it would be perfectly
consistent for the judge under Rule 403 to exclude evidence of
the client's misconduct while admitting testimony about the
attorney's misconduct.

2. The evidence should be inadmissible against the client because it would be unfair to impute the attorney's misconduct to
the client
In a sense, if the judge admits the attorney's misconduct as
evidence against the client, the judge is holding the client vicariously responsible for the attorney's misconduct. The courts
ordinarily impose respondeat superior liability on a master or
principal only when the actor is a servant or agent.76Technically, the attorney is an independent contractor rather than an
agent or servant of the client.77When an employment relationship amounts to an agency relationship, the principal has
control over both the ends the employee pursues and the means
the employee uses to achieve those endd8 In contrast, a relationship constitutes an independent contract when the principal dictates only the result t o be achieved?' The client does
instruct the attorney as to what legal outcome the client desires. However, since the client does not tell the attorney which
privilege arguments to invoke or discovery motions to file, the
attorney is an independent contractor. In addition, the client
may not have authorized or ratified the discovery misconduct
in question. It therefore seems t o exceed the appropriate limits
of agency law to admit evidence of the attorney's misconduct
against the client.
That line of argument might well be persuasive if the issue
were the imposition of tort liability on the client for the
attorney's conduct. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff sued
the attorney's client for the tort of abuse of process.80During
an earlier lawsuit on behalf of the client, the attorney might
have filed an otherwise proper motion for an illicit, ulterior

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

W. PAGEKEmN

El' AL., ON THE LAW OF TORTS$$ 69-71 (5th ed. 1984).
WARRENA. SEAVEY,
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF AGENCY
$ 6 (1964).
Id.; Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1993).
Frankel, 987 F.2d at 89; see SEAVEY,
supra note 77, $ 6.
KEET~N
ET AL., supra note 76, $ 121.
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purpose.81 If the evidence established that the client had neither authorized nor ratified the attorney's conduct, the defendant client might escape liability in the subsequent abuse of
process action.
However, in other contexts, the client is in effect held vicariously responsible for the attorney's c0nduct.8~Liability to
discovery sanctions is a case in point. The attorney's misconduct can expose the client to a wide range of sanctions, including court orders enforceable directly against the client. For
instance, when the judge orders issue preclusion or evidence
preclusion as a sanction,83the burden of the order falls upon
the client. Sanctions law permits the judge to enter these orders against the client even when the client's attorney is the
A sanction is a type of penalty. In a broad sense,
mi~creant.8~
when the judge admits evidence of the attorney's misconduct
against the client, the client is being penalized for the
attorney's misbehavior; the admission of the evidence is simply

81. Id.
82. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (holding the
client liable for the a d s of his "freely selected agentn).
83. 2 JAMES
E. HOGAN,MODERN
CALIFORNIA
DISCOVERY
$ 15.4 (4th ed. 1988);
8 CHARLESA. WRIGHT& ARTHUR R. MILLER,FEDERAL
~'RACTICE AND PROCEDURE
$ 2281 (1970).
84. It is true that under revised Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, it is
ordinarily improper to impose a sanction on the client unless the client is guilty of
personal misconduct. Slane v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 115 F.R.D. 61
(D.Colo. 1987). See generally JOSEPH,supra note 14, $ 16(E)(1). However, as a
general rule of sanctions law, the client may be held responsible for the attorney's
misconduct. As the court remarked in Farm Construction Services v. Fudge, 831
F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1987):
With resped to appellant's claim that sanctions should have been imposed
on counsel rather than the client, this argument would require us to
ignore established law. In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S.
626, . . . (1962), the Supreme Court expressly stated,
There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of
petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this
t
attorney as his representative in the action and he c a ~ o now
avoid the consequences of the a d s or omissions of this freely selected agent.
370 U.S. 626, 633-34 . . . . This Circuit, following Link, has turned a
"deaf ear" to the plea that "the sins of the attorney should not be visited
upon the client."
The client, of course, has the ultimate remedy of suing her attorney for malpractice. See also Leonard E . Gross, Suppression of Evidence as a Remedy for Attorney
Misconduct: Shall the Sins of the Attoney Be Visited upon the Client?, 54 ALB. L.
REV. 437 (1990).
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another kind of penalty. If an attorney's misconduct can trigger
a sanction assessed directly against the client, the misconduct
should be admissible against the client at trial.
Moreover, the Federal Rules of Evidence make it clear that
the parameters of agency law no longer define the limits of
admissibility. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) reads:

. . (2) The statement is offered
against a party and is . . . (C)a statement by a.person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made within the existence of the relationship . . . .85
A statement is not hearsay i f .

Subsection (C) codifies the old, conservative view, conditioning
the admission of an agent's statements against the principal on
proof that the principal had authorized the agent to serve as a
spokesper~on.~~
Under that view, the courts were reluctant to
characterize an attorney's out-of-court statements and acts as
admissions provable against the attorney's client?
However, subsection (D) breaks down the traditional equation between agency law and evidence law? Under (D), while
the declarant must be an agent and the declaration must relate
t o the agent's employment duties, it is no longer necessary that
the declaration itself be authorized or ratified by the principal.
Further, the courts have liberally interpreted the term "agent"
in subsection (D); significantly, they have construed the term
as encompassing attorneys,sgwho are technically independent
contractors. As a result, the vicarious admission doctrine, set
out in subsection (D), has been extended to out-of-court statements by attorneys.g0
85. FED. R. EVID.801(d).
86. CARLSON
ET AL., supra note 42, at 601-02.
87. GARD,supra note 26, 4 13:34, a t 488.
ET AL., supra note 42, at 602.
88. CARLSON
89. United States v. McClellan, 868 F.2d 210, 214-15 (7th Cir. 1989); United
States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 30-33 (2d Cir. 1984); Jacobs Mfg. Co. v. Sam
Brown Co., 792 F. Supp. 1520, 1531 (W.D. Mo. 1992) ("Generally, admissions of
fact made by counsel are binding upon their principals so long a s they are unequivocal."); Kohne v. Yost, 818 P.2d 360 Wont. 1991) (binding admission made
459-60 (3d ed.
during closing argument); DAVIDF. BINDER,HEARSAYHANDBOOK
1991); Gary S. Humble, Evidentiary Admissions of Defense Counsel in Federal
Criminal Cases, 24 AM. CRIM.L. REV. 93 (1986); Biting the Hand That Feeds You:

The Admissibility of an Attorney's Statements Against His Client in Criminal ProseNEWSL.,June 1993, a t 1.
cutions, 1 CORP. CRIMES& INVESTIG.
90. BINDER,supra note 89, a t 459-60 (collecting cases which have extended
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Hence, under both sanctions law and hearsay doctrine, the
attorney's actions and statements can be imputed to the client
although the client has not authorized the action or statement.
Even combined with the unauthorized character of the act or
statement, the attorney's status as an independent contractor
does not preclude the imputation. If sanctions law and hearsay
doctrine fix the benchmark, it is justifiable to impute the
attorney's discovery misconduct to the client and treat the
misconduct as an admission by the client.
3. The admission of the attorney's misconduct against the
client is contrary to public policy because the specter of admission might deter counsel fron vigorously asserting her client's
rights during pretrial discovery
As previously stated, Professor Mansfield's position is that
the evidential use of a party's litigation conduct should be forbidden when admitting the evidence would likely deter an
activity furthering an important objective of the judicial sysIn particular, he believes that the parties' pretrial investigative activity furthers vital objectives of the judicial systerng2-facilitating pretrial evaluation of claims (and their ensuing settlement) and contributing to more accurate fact finding at trial.g3 He asserts that pretrial investigative activity
should therefore be largely "~ninhibited."~~
Attaching "an evidential cost" to such activity might discourage discovery and
make it more difficult for the judicial system t o promote pretrial settlement and accurate fact findingOg5
Professor Mansfield's argument lends some support t o the
contention that treating the attorney's discovery misconduct as
an admission by the client would contravene public policy. The
experience with sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11is also supportive. It has been suggested that the standards for imposing sanctions under Rule 11 are so vague that
the mere prospect of sanctions is having a chilling effect on
Even the drafters of Rule 11
vigorous advocacy by litigat~rs.'~
the vicarious admission doctrine in this way).
91. Mansfield, supra note 25, at 701-02.
92. Id. at 727.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 728 n.90.
96. Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule I l - S o m e
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74
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acknowledge that if enforced unpredictably, the rule may "chill
an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or
legal the~ries."~'With some anecdotal evidence:'
one commentator asserts that "[tlhe lawyer who hears the footsteps of
sanctions may be less willing to pursue an aggressive course or
to advance a novel . . . theory?'
Albeit plausible, this argument is unconvincing. It is true
that in the main, attorneys should be encouraged to conduct a
thorough pretrial investigation of their clients' position; and the
policy of encouraging pretrial investigation may warrant the
recognition of a general exclusionary rule barring evidential
use of investigative activity. However, the focus of this article
is on discovery misconduct. As Professor Mansfield himself has
stated, "There should be an exception, it is suggested, because
if there was misconduct, the case falls outside the exclusionary
policy. There is no reason to protect and encourage misconduct."'" Discovery misconduct in the precise form of obstructionism has become such a substantial problem that the judiciary should be taking steps to deter it.''' The case for excluding evidence of discovery misconduct overstates the risk of
chilling legitimate attorney behavior and overlooks the policy
considerations favoring the admission of such evidence.
It is debatable whether Rule 11is having the claimed chilling effect.lo2However, even assuming the truth of that claim,
it does not follow that treating an attorney's obstructionism as
an admission by the client would have a similar impact. Rule
11 supposedly generates a chilling effect because its substantive standards are ambiguous and its application is consequentThe text of Rule 11 undeniably contains
ly ~npredictable.'~~
GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986).
97. FED. R. CN. P. 11 advisory comm. note (1983).
98. Alex Elson & Edwin A. Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence,
'
123 F.R.D. 361 (1988); Russ M. Herman, Rule 11 Is Prejudicial to Plaintiffs, NATL
L.J., July 24, 1989, at 17; Martha Middleton, Creative Advocates Scared W, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 24, 1989, at 3 (citing a Third Circuit study); Jerold S. Solovy et al.,
Sanctions Under Fedeml Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 33 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE354
PROCESS 8-10,
(1989). But see THOMASE. WILLGING,THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING
157-68 (1988) (a Federal Judicial Center study finding little evidence of a chilling
impact).
99. Daniel S. Hinerfeld, The Sanctions Explosion, CAL. LAW.,Nov. 1987, at
33.
100. Letter from John H. Mansfield to Edward J. Imwinkelried (Feb. 23, 1993).
101. See'supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
102. See WILLGING,supm note 98, at 8-10, 157-68 (Federal Judicial Center
study disputing the claim).
103. Middleton, supra note 98, at 3; Note, PZausible Pleadings: Developing
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broad, rather vague language. For example, under Rule 11, a n
attorney's filing is sanctionable if the filing is "interposed for
any improper purpose."lM It is understandable that language
so indefinite and expansive might give a practicing attorney
pause.
However, the admission-by-conduct theory relates to a
narrower, more readily identifiable category of behavior. To
trigger the theory, the proponent of the evidence a t trial must
do more than point to a n unethical act by the opposing attorney. To begin with, the act must be intentional. Moreover, the
act must be in the nature of the suppression of evidencelo5 or
the obstruction of access to evidence. Unless the act falls into
this category of conduct, as a matter of logic the a d will not
give rise to the inference of consciousness of liability or guilt.
Including a frivolous count in a complaint might subject the
plaintiff's attorney to a Rule 11 sanction;lo6 but standing
alone, that conduct would not sustain a permissive inference
that the plaintiffs attorney was attempting to block the
defense's access to any evidence. Rule 11 has an exceptionally
broad sweep, but the admission theory would apply to a much
more limited category of attorney behavior.
Not only is it an exaggeration to claim that the application
of the admission theory to attorney misconduct will chill competent representation during pretrial discovery; the claim also
overlooks policy considerations that more than counterbalance
any potential chill. The threat of discipline imposed by the bar
has been largely ineffective to deter discovery misconduct.107
In many jurisdictions, the slow pace of bar disciplinary proceedings'" robs the threat of much of its credibility. Likewise, the
prospect of sanctions imposed by the judge has not curbed
discovery misconduct. For that matter, embroiling the innocent
party in time-consuming, satellite litigation over sanctions may
work to the advantage of the guilty party--especially i n "fast
trackn j~risdictions.'~~
However, treating the attorney's misconduct as the client's
admission may strike the right pressure point: the client. The
Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987).
104. FED.R. CIV.P. 11.
105. GARD,supm note 26, 8 13:46, at 517.
106. Note, supra note 103, at 634-44.
107. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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client pays the attorney's fee, and hence the client is in a better
position than either the bar or the judge to effectively bring the
attorney's discovery misconduct to a halt. Once the client realizes that such misconduct may be provable against him at trial,
the client will have good reason to instruct the attorney t o
eschew obstructionism. If the person who pays the bill gives
the attorney that instruction, the attorney is likely to take the
instruction seriously. If there is a need to deter discovery misconduct, the legal system should apply the deterrent pressure
where it will do the most good. The attorney might not be in
awe of the authority of either the bar or the judge, but the
attorney is likely to heed the client who wields the power of the
purse.
4. The evidence should be excluded on the ground that the ad-

mission of such evidence will pressure the client's attorney to
testify in violation of the advocate-witness prohibition
As in the case of the client's personal discovery misconduct,
the final counterargument rests on the advocate-witness prohibition. However, in this context, the counterargument is stronger..
As in the case of the client's own misconduct, there will be
times when the counterargument fails merely because there is
little or no need for testimony by an attorney in violation of the
prohibition. If the only issue is whether the attorney committed
the act in question, there may be better evidence than the
attorney's testimony. There might be third party witnesses t o
the act who are less biased than the attorneys, or by happenstance, an impartial court official or a disinterested layperson
may have been present. Or the act might be documented and
described in detail by the transcript of the deposition hearing
where the misconduct allegedly occurred. Even when the pivotal issue is why the attorney committed the act in question,
there might be better evidence than the attorney's own trial
testimony. By the time of trial when the attorney realizes the
contemplated evidential use of her conduct, her bias would
probably have the greatest impact on her testimony. In contrast, if at the time of the act she stated her intent or motivation, not only would the statement arguably be admissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3),'1° the reliability of

110. Rule 803 authorizes the admission of a statement of a declarant's "then
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the pretrial statement would also be less suspect than the
attorney's trial testimony. Thus, in some cases, it may be possible t o present evidence of the attorney's discovery misconduct
at trial without necessitating testimony by the attorneys on
either side.
Realistically, though, such cases will be rare. In the more
typical case, one or both of the clients may have a bona fide
need to call their attorney to the stand to testify about the
alleged discovery misconduct. The only persons present may
have been the two attorneys, and the issue of the occurrence of
the act may be a swearing contest between the attorneys. Even
when it is uncontroverted that the act occurred, there may be a
serious question about the motivation for the act; at the time of
the a d , the attorney may not have made a contemporaneous
avowal of her intent. In these cases, if the judge admits evidence of the attorney's discovery misconduct, the evidence will
almost inevitably inject the issue of the attorney's credibility
into the case. The courts have tended to apply the advocatewitness prohibition when the introduction of such evidence will
have that effect?
Part I of this article demonstrated that when the proffered
evidence describes the client's own misconduct, the proponent
can frequently moot the question of the advocate-witness prohibition by demonstrating that there is no necessity for attorney
testimony. In that context, the prohibition does not preclude
the adoption of a general rule admitting evidence of the client's
misconduct even if we accept the prohibition at face value.
However, in most cases in which the evidence relates t o misconduct by the client's attorney, the proponent will be unable to
moot the issue of the application of the prohibition. When the
focus is squarely on the attorney's behavior, the introduction of
the evidence may prompt one or both of the parties t o resort t o
attorney testimony. For that reason, we must confront the
policy question of whether the prohibition mandates a general
rule excluding evidence of the attorney's misconduct. That
question should be answered in the negative.
To begin with, an affirmative answer would represent
Catch 22 reasoning. The advocate-witness prohibition is a rule

existing state of mind" when the state of mind is relevant under Rule 401. In this
variation of the problem, the focus is on the attorney's state of mind.
111. United States v. Melo, 702 F. Supp; 939 (D. Mass. 1988); People v.
Paperno, 429 N.E.2d 797 (N.Y. 1981).
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of legal ethics rather than evidence.l12 An affirmative answer
entails invoking that rule af legal ethics to shield at trial evidence of the attorney's discovery misconduct. However, that
misconduct is likely to amount to a violation of other rules of
legal ethics.l13 A.B.A. Model Rule 3.4(a) forbids an attorney
from "unlawfully obstruct[ing] another party's access to evidence or unlawfidly alter[ing], destroy[ing] or conceal[ing] a
document or other material having potential evidentiary value."'l4 After listing these forbidden acts, the same rule prohibits an attorney from "counsel[ing] or assist[ing] another
person t o do any such act."ll5 Rule 3.4(d) makes it a disciplinary offense to "fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply
with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing par3.40 adds that an attorney may not "request a
t ~ . " " Rule
~
person other than a client t o refrain from voluntarily giving
relevant information t o another party.""' All of these acts are
classic examples of admissions by conduct, and all of these acts
are direct violations of the legal ethical standards prescribed by
the Model Rules. It is wrong-minded t o allow the opposing
client to cite one rule of legal ethics t o exclude evidence of conduct which is independently violative of other rules of legal
ethics. Permitting the opposition t o do so compounds the violation.
Furthermore, it is of dubious wisdom t o use the mechanism of an evidentiary exclusionary rule to enforce this rule of
legal ethics. Professor Mansfield has written that none of the
rationales advanced for the advocate-witness prohibition is
"entirely ~atisfactory.""~Other respected commentators have
voiced doubts about the advisability of the rule.llg Whatever
may be the merit of the prohibition as a doctrine of legal ethics,
the case for using an evidentiary exclusionary rule t o enforce
the doctrine is unconvincing. The very evolution of the legal

112. UNDERWOOD
& FORTUNE,supra note 46, ch. 4.
113. Id. ch. 6.
114. MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT
Rule 3.4(a) (1983).
115. Id. Rule 3 . a ) .
116. Id. Rule 3.4(d).
117. Id. Rule 3.4(f).
118. Mansfield, supra note 25, at 704.
119. Arnold N. Enker, The Rationale of the Rule That Forbicls a Lawyer to Be
an Advocate and Witness in the Same Case, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.RES. J. 455; Richard C. Wydick, Dial Counsel as Witness: The Code. and the Model Rules, 15 U.C.
DAVISL. REV. 651, 659 (1982).
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ethics doctrine suggests a growing understanding that it is
unjustifiable to use an evidentiary enforcement mechanism.
The starting point in the evolution of the doctrine was the
extreme version of the rule vicariously disqualifying the other
members of the advocate-witness' firm as well as personally
disqualifying the advocate-witness. That was the version set
out in the American Bar Association's former Code of ProfesConcededly, when the same attorney
sional Re~ponsibi1ity.l~~
testifies and presents the closing argument, there may be a
risk that the jury will confuse the facts testified t o and the
inferences argued during summation. The risk of jury confusion
is a probative danger which the judge may factor into her Rule
403 analysis.l2l However, the commentator^'^ noted that
risk is absent when another attorney from the firm serves as
trial advocate; one attorney testifies, but a different attorney
delivers the opening statement and closing argument.lB The
exclusion of the attorney-witness' testimony is indefensible;
there is no more risk of confusion than there would be when
the trial advocate calls any other witness to the stand.
In part due to such criticism, the doctrine evolved into a
more limited rule which merely personally disqualified the trial
advocate. Under this version of the rule, an attorney-witness
may testify if another member of the firm tries the case, but an
attorney-witness may not testify at a hearing she herself is
trying. This is the narrower, modified version of the doctrine
set out in the new Rules of Professional Conduct.lMAlthough
the modification of the doctrine is more defensible than the
earlier version, even the modification has not escaped criticism.
In defense of the modified doctrine, it is sometimes argued that
the opposition is "handicapped in challenging the credibility of
the lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advocate in the

120. MODELCODEOF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
DR 5-101 (1969).
121. FED. R. EVID. 403.
122. Harold A. Brown & Louis M. Brown, Disqualification of the Testifying
Advocate-A Firm Rule?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 597, 609-11 (1979); see also, UNDERWOOD
& FORTUNE,supra note 46, 5 4.8, at 162; Jeffrey A. Stonerock, The Advocate-Witness Rule: Anachronism or Necessary Restraint?, 94 DICK.L. REV. 821 (1990) (advocating abolition of the rule and suggesting that the rule's purpose could be better
served by simply applying Federal Rule of Evidence 403 under the court's supervisory power).
& F O ~ N Esupm
,
note 46, § 4.2, a t 142 ("little chance that
123. UNDERWOOD
the line between fact and argument will be blurred"); Brown & Brown, supra note
122, at 609-11 (1979).
124. MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
C O N D URule
~ 3.7 (1983).
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case."125 However, that argument is spurious. Perhaps the
most potent impeachment technique is proof of the witness's
bias.lz6 Even before any cross-examination of the attorneywitness, it becomes evident to the jury that the attorneywitness's credibility is impeachable for bias. The jury has seen
the lawyer serve as the client's attorney during the earlier
stages of the trial, and that same lawyer now takes the stand
as a witness. The inference of the advocate-witness's bias is
obvious, strong, and undeniable.
Can the modified doctrine be defended on the alternative
ground that there is a risk of jury confusion? The risk is certainly greater than it would be in a case where one firm member serves as trial attorney but another fun member testifies.
In that case, there is little risk that the jury will confuse the
facts testified to by one attorney and the inferences argued by
the other. Here the same attorney testifies to facts and later
argues inferences. Yet even in this situation, the risk of confusion is inadequate justification for excluding the attorney's
testimony.
In many published opinions, the courts have upheld the
admission of a witness's direct testimony in which the witness
testified to both facts and opinionated inferences from the
facts.12?For example, the cases are legion permitting experienced police officers t o both factually describe an accused's
conduct and opine that the conduct matches the modus operandi for a particular rime.'^ In these opinions, the courts have
made short shrift of the contention that the testimony presents
an intolerable risk that the jury will mistake inference for
fact? However, the potential risk of confusion in the above
situations dwarfs the potential risk presented when an attor125. 3 DAVIDW. LOUISELL& CHRISTOPHER
B. MUELLER,FEDERALEVIDENCE
§ 252 (rev. ed. 1985) (quoting CODEOF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
EC 5-9).
J. IMWINKELRIED,
THE METHODSOF ATTACKING
SCIENTIFICEVI126. EDWARD
DENCE § 9-7, at 240 (2d ed. 1992) ("Bias impeachment is one of the best weight
attacks, since the jurors can easily understand the attack."). The Supreme Court
has accorded special constitutional status to the right to impeach a witness for
bias. EDWARD
J. IMWINKELRIED, EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE:
THE ACCUSED'SCONSTJTUTIONAL RIGHTTO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE
8 8-7b (1990).
FAVORABLE
127. United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Thomas, 896 F.2d 589 (D.C.Cir. 1990); Phylis S. Bamberger, The Dangerous Expert Witness, 52 BROOK.L. REV. 855, 856-57 (1986).
128. Edward J. Imwinkelried & Ephraim Margolin, The Case for the Admissibility of Defense Testimony About Customary Political Practices in Wu:ial Corruption Prosecutions, 29 AM. CRIM.L. REV. 1, 17-21 (1991).
129. See id. for a collection of cases.
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ney argues inferences hours, days, or weeks after testifying to
facts. The time gap between the testimony and the argument
reduces the risk to a level far below the danger of confusion
present in the opinions which discuss other types of witnesses.
If the danger of confusion does not warrant the exclusion of the
testimony in those opinions, a fortiori the risk does not justify
evidentiary enforcement of the advocate-witness prohibition.
A new ethical rule, adopted by the California bar, reflects a
further step in the evolution of the advocate-witness doctrine.
Under Rule 5-210, which took effect in 1989, the client's attorney may testify over the opposing party's objection. The only
requisite is "the informed, written consent of the client."130
The implicit assumption of Rule 5-210 is that the opposing
party should not have the benefit of an evidentiary
exclusionary rule to block testimony by the client's attorney. If
the proponent of the opposing attorney's discovery misconduct
desires to call his attorney to prove the alleged misconduct, the
proponent may. Similarly, the opposing client may call his
attorney to rebut the allegation.
Even in the jurisdictions which have not yet followed the
lead of the California bar, there are indications of growing
judicial dissatisfaction with the advocate-witness prohibition.
Many courts have rejected disqualification motions based on
the prohibition for the stated reason that testimony by the
attorney would be cu~nulative.'~'Some c ~ u r t shave gone to
the length of ruling that even when there might otherwise be a
genuine need for the attorney's testimony about a certain fact,
an offer by the attorney's client to stipulate to that fact eliminates the need. 132
It would be dishonest to overstate either the extent of the
liberalization of the advocate-witness prohibition or the likelihood that courts will admit testimony violative of the prohibition. Most jurisdictions remain committed to either the original, broad prohibition or the modified version of the doctrine.
There is a large body of modern case law recognizing the advo-

130. RULESOF ~ O F E S S I O N A LCONDUCT
OF THE STATEBAROF CALIFORNIA
Rule
5-210(C) (1989).
131. Banque Arabe et Int'l D'Inv. v. Ameritrust Corp., 690 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.
Ohio 1988); Clinton Mills, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 226
(D.S.C. 1988); Gaul1 v. Wyeth Lab., 687 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Brotherhood
Ry. Carmen v. Delpro Co., 549 F. Supp. 780, 788 (D.Del. 1982).
132. United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1986); Zions First Nat'l
Bank v. United Health Clubs, 505 P. Supp. 138 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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cate-witness prohibition.ls3 To borrow a phrase once applied
to a much-maligned contract doctrine, t h e courts have often enforced the prohibition "with a rigor worthy of a better
c a ~ s e . " 'The
~ upshot is that many jurisdictions will undoubtedly continue to employ an evidentiary exclusionary rule to bar
testimony by either attorney trying the case. If the proponent
proffers testimony about the opposing attorney's discovery
misconduct, judges in these jurisdictions will be inclined to fmd
the testimony objectionable.

This article has advanced the thesis that a t trial, a litigant
should be permitted to treat the opposition's pretrial discovery
obstructionism as a n admission by conduct of the weakness of
the opposition's position in the litigation. In the foreseeable
future, the thesis is likely to make only limited inroads with
the courts. As Part I1 pointed out, the jurisdictions which are
still committed to the advocate-witness prohibition may balk at
admitting testimony about the attorney's discovery misconduct.
Part I presents the less controversial argument for applying the
admission theory to the client's personal discovery misconduct,
but even that argument may strike some courts as too avantgarde; the courts are likely to admit evidence of client misconduct only when there is "the clearest proof."'35
Although this article presents a novel theory, it is one
worth pressing. The admission-by-conduct theory is a wellsettled one; and discovery obstructionism by either the client or
the client's attorney is probative on that theory. Moreover, the
theory is a promising deterrent to discovery misconduct against
which neither bar discipline nor judicial sanction has proved to
be a n effective disincentive. The admission-by-conduct theory is
promising precisely because it can make the client pay in a
meaningful sense for discovery misconduct. Once the client
comes to that realization, the client may desist from misconduct. More importantly, the client may tell the attorney that
133. David B. Harrison, Annotation, Disqualif~ationof Attorney Because Member of His Firm Is or Ought to Be Witness in Case-Modern Cases, 5 A.L.R.4th 574
(1981).
134. JOHN D. CALAMARI
& JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTSQ 221(a), at 102 (3d ed. 1987) (commenting on the common law rule that to form a
contract, the terms of an acceptance must be an absolutely perfect "mirror-image"
of the terms of the offer).
135. GARD,supra note 26, 8 13:34, at 485.
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the attorney is to refrain from discovery misconduct. Even a n
attorney who has little regard for the bar or judiciary may
listen closely to the client who controls the purse strings.
Sadly, in the past the minority of attorneys bent on h s trating the discovery system have been more creative than the
majority of attorneys who litigate in good faith. The former
have whole "bags N 1 of tricks," including obstructionist tactics.ls6 It is time that the latter match the creativity of the
former. An imaginative, offensive strategy against discovery
misconduct is long overdue.13' The admission-by-conduct theory may be that strategy.

136. Peter Gruenberger, Discovery Abusers Have Many Bags Full of Tricks, LEGAL TIMES,July 4, 1983, at 18.

137. UNDERWOOD
& FORTUNE,
supra note 46, 8 5.9, at 204 ("Counsel should be
alert to opportunities to turn the consequences of an opponent's misconduct back
upon-him or her.").

